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Dipartimento di Scienze EconomicheThe exclusive privileges of corporations, statutes of apprenticeship, and all those laws
which restrain, in particular employments, the competition to a smaller number than
might otherwise go into them, uare a sort of enlarged monopolies, and may
frequently, for ages together, and in a whole classes of employments, keep up the
market prices of particular commodities above the natural price, and maintain both
the wages of the labour and the profits of the stock employed about them somewhat
above their natural rate.  flushright 
Introduction
The self-regulating profession displays a substantial discretion to restrict entry in the market;
indeed, it is often successful in imposing additional requirements in terms training programs and
human capital and plays an active role in the selection of perspective candidates. The rationale
for that lies in the fact that active professionals should be better suited to establish the
educational profiles and to evaluate the quality of the applicant. Comparative evidence about
legal, accountancy, and ingeneering professional services clearly indicates that this institutional
arrangement is prevalent across countries; furthermore, legislation often allows the professions to
operate in non-competitive regimes (OCDE 1995).
Starting from the seminal work by Friedman and Kuznets (1945), economists have raised the
issue whether these institutional barriers to entry were successful not only in preserving the
average quality of the member, but also in raising the rate of return of the profession up to
supernormal levels. In this case, self-regulation could limit competition within the industry and
raise the concern of antitrust authorities. Some studies have collected evidence that the American
Medical Association restricted the supply of physicians lobbying successfully to reduce the
number of accredited medical schools (Curran 1993). In a related study, Becker (1986) has
shown that additional requirements tend to increase professional incomes and some states are
more prone to be ÒcapturedÓ the lower is voter participation in elections, the higher is the level
of education. This allows a larger representation of consumer interests within the legislature.
Some tests have been developed to establish also the welfare effects of admission policies;
analysing in cross-section US states, Svorny (1987) has found a negative correlation between the
number of physicians and the level of qualification imposed by regulation. Interpreting the
former as a proxy for the equilibrium demand for professional services, a more restrictive
regulation has reduced consumer surplus; indeed, consumers did not increase demand despite the
higher qualification of operating professionals.
While the effects of input regulation have raised the attention of economists, quite
surprisingly the economic literature about the impact on the competitiveness of the industry of
admission rates is very limited. Boards generally display substantial control on the pass-to-fail
ratio that may reveal a powerful instrument to manipulate the supply side of the market and
generate undue economic rents. As Maurizi (1974) has shown, a large number of self-regulating
professions failure rates appear to be correlated to prevailing economic conditions. Demand
fluctuations seem indeed responsible of a manipulative activity by the Boards: admissions are
restricted to respond to a decrease in activity or to prolong a period of high incomes due to
expantionary demand.
Aim of the present paper is essentially twofold; first, we try to carry out a descriptive analysis
on the Italian accountancy market. In this area the urge for quantification is compelling, since
separate figures for the professional service market are not reported on national account
statistics. Second, we build two different specifications of a dynamic panel data model for the
demand and supply for accountancy services taking explicitly into account admission rates as a
crucial determinants for the equilibrium emerging in the market.
Two major stylized facts emerge from the descriptive analysis: first, the convergence in the
last years in incomes of the two professions operating with different licensure requirements,
namely Ragionieri and Commercialisti; second, the existence of a substantial earning differentialbetween the two professions despite the recent trends. We claim that the rate of entry, and in
particular, the admission policy in the profession implemented each year by Boards, provides
some interesting insights to explain this evidence.
From an empirical analyis in a dynamic setting, we obtain the following results: first, lagged
admission rates represent an important factor to explain professional incomes. In particular, we
find a strong negative correlation between the two variables, confirming the view that
institutional barriers to entry are successful in creating economic rents. Second, and maybe more
importantly, admission rates are an endogenous variable and deeply influenced by past level of
incomes.
Indeed, a negative correlation between admission rates and accountants’ income might
indicate that consumers are just paying higher prices for a more qualified service that is
warranted by professionals with higher skills, namely those given who survived the hard
selection. In this case, the anti-competitive effect of institutional barriers to entry has to be
weighted with the increase in consumer surplus due to the higher quality of the good exchanged.
Our findings provide some evidence that on average the admission policy by Board is more
influenced by past market condition than by the average quality of the candidate. Furthermore,
despite our result are far away to be conclusive, we suspect that, where implemented, the
quality-inducing policy via entry restriction has failed to restore efficiency in a market pervaded
by information asymmetries.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides a descriptive analysis of the italian
market for accountancy services and characterises the details of the institutional setting; section 3
presents our specification for the market for accountants; section 4 presents the empirical results
of our panel data simultaneous equations estimation. Section 5 concludes.
The accounting profession in Italy
In this section we provide a brief analysis of the working of the market for accounting
services over the period 1980-91. In Italy such services can be supplied by professionals enrolled
in two professional bodies (Ragionieri and Commercialisti). The main difference between the
two bodies concerns the length of the academic curriculum required in order to be allowed to
practice. In the period under observation to become a Commercialista one had to get a four years
university degree in Economics and then to pass an examination to some extent controlled by the
professional body, while to become a Ragioniere there was no need for any university education
but, in order to be admitted to the professional exam, three years of working experience were
required. footnote 
Once the professional examination is passed, the new professionals can enter the market
without further constraints in terms of regional quotas or freedom of settlement - as it is the case
for other professions in Italy (e.g. public notaries) -. Moreover, except the above institutional
differences in the educational requirements, the regulatory regime does not foresee any other
limit for either profession in dealing with specific classes of clients or in providing some types of
services. As a consequence, there is no functional distinction between the markets for the two
professions such as there is in England and Wales between solicitors and barristers. footnote 
In this respect, the Italian market for accounting services and the two aforementioned
professions undoubtedly represents a good setting in order to test the hypothesis according to
which self-regulating professional bodies which are given discretion over the procedures to enter
the market, tend to use it not in raising the quality level, but in raising the income level of the
members of the profession.
Trends in the two professions
The following analysis draws from two main data sets. The first is the Archivio delle
Professioni built by INPS, the Italian state-owned company managing the compulsory pension
schemes. The archivio includes personal data and reported incomes of all the Italian
professionals from 1980 to 1991. footnote  As you can see from Figure 1, over the period, thecumulative number of records for the two professions here under investigation has been between
20,000 and 37,000.
The second data set, ANCITEL, includes about 250 socio-economic variables at the
city/town level (about 8,500 observations for each year). Such data are collected from several
official sources such as ISTAT (the national agency for statistics, Bank of Italy, the Ministry of
Finance, other regulatory agencies, providers of public services such as telephone services,
electricity, etc.). This second data set is used in order to better understand how the economic
fundamentals of the market for accounting services are related with the economic structure in
which are provided.
The two professions under investigation are in the middle range of the Italian professions as
for the number of registered members. To get a comparative idea, the largest profession is that of
medical doctors with some 300,000 registered members in 1991 of whom most are employed in
the National Health Service, followed by the engineers (100,000), and by the lawyers (60,000).
Much smaller professional bodies are the architects (9,000) and the public notaries
(4,000). footnote 
As one can see from Figure 1, Commercialisti and Ragionieri started from a very similar
membership in 1980 (approximately 10,000) with the Commercialisti slightly below the
Ragionieri, but then followed a different pattern of growth in the period under observation. By
1991, the Ragionieri reached about 15,000, while the Commercialisti went up to over 22,500
(about 4 over 1,000 people). This difference is particularly remarkable if one recalls that the two
professions can supply precisely the same type of services and that there is no public regulation
on entry except that delegated to the professional bodies. Moreover, among the rapidly growing
service industries, the market for accountants would not appear to be subjected to technological
changes of such magnitude as to justify such a rapid shift from one kind of supplier to another.
For these reasons one is led to look for institutional explanations of such a low initial
proportion of accountants with a university education. In this respect, there are perhaps two
institutional factors which might explain such differences: First, on the supply side, Italy only in
the late ’70s and early ’80s, has witnessed a large increase in the university population due to the
reduction of the fees and to a massive increase in the supply of courses in the public universities.
Therefore, at the beginning of the ’80s the relatively low proportion of accountants with a
university degree can be explained mainly referring to a generally low share of population with a
university degree. Second, on the demand side, the Italian average firm size is much smaller than
that prevailing in other developed countries (Barca 1992). On its turn this small scale effect has a
negative influence on the demand for highly specialised accounting services.
Taking into account these two institutional factors, however, one can only partially
understand the differences in growth rates of the two professions in Figure 2. Indeed, while the
reduction in the opportunity cost of getting a university degree can explain the constantly higher
growth rates of the accountants with such a degree during the ’80s, since the university reform
takes time to affect the market for professional services, it is less clear the impact of the second
factor. Indeed, the Italian industrial structure has not experienced major changes as for the
average size of the firm before or during the period under observation. This means that there has
not been a structural shift in the demand of services required by the firms in consequence of a
more complex organisational structure. It follows that the differences in the growth rates are to
be explained mainly with supply variables or with a growing demand for more sophisticated
accounting services - which might explain an increase in the proportion of Commercialisti over
Ragionieri.
In a different perspective, Figure 2 shows that both growth rates decline over the years, with
the Commercialisti starting over 8 % and ending up at less than 6 %, and the Ragionieri starting
not far from 5 % and declining to less than 3 %. The two rates are correlated, but by no means
perfectly so. Indeed, the Commercialisti witness a relatively high rate of entry (over 8 %) till
1988, and then decline swiftly to a final level below 6 %, while the Ragionieri are characterised
by a much smoother trend in the growth rates.
The drop for the Commercialisti can be interpreted as the beginning of a period in which,after about 10 years in which the supply of accountants with a degree had grown to compensate
the previous scarcity, the market adjusted to a lower equilibrium. Alternatively, the drop in the
growth rates can be seen as a signal of a greater control of the professional body over entry. The
rationale for this behaviour can be seen in the growing competition in the market for accounting
services. In comparison, the entry for the Ragionieri follows a much smoother pattern possibly
for symmetric reasons: there had been no comparable shock on the supply side due to
institutional reasons, and therefore there was less urge to take measure in order to restrict entry
after a large inflow of new members.
Regional distribution of professionals
In this section we look at the regional distribution of the professional in order to see whether
they actually operate in different markets in terms of economic fundamentals although we have
seen that they are not legally separated. This is because in Italy, each large area (North, Centre
and South) has distinct economic features which to some extent may provide insights on the
functional characteristics of the two professions. In particular, we will provisionally assume that
there are at least two components in the demand for accounting services. First a basic demand
expressed by individuals and very small firms, and distributed uniformly across regions and,
second, a more sophisticated demand expressed by larger firms or firms operating in
international markets.
In Figure 3 the Italian regions are geographically ranked on the horizontal axis from North
(left) to South (right). The more heavily industrialised Northern regions witness only a slightly
higher density of Ragionieri than the Southern ones. In this respect the highest density of
Ragionieri is to be found in the regions of the Centre which are characterised by a large number
of very small firms.
A rather different picture emerges in the regional distribution of the Commercialisti. With the
exception of Lazio - the region which includes Rome, and therefore all the Ministries and the
central bureaucracies - the more industrialised Northern regions witness a much higher average
density than the Central, and especially the Southern ones.
If one looks at the difference between the density of Commercialisti and of Ragionieri as a
proxy for the size of the market for specialised accounting services, the data summarised in
Figure 3 clearly support the idea that such a market exists, and that is heavily concentrated in the
Northern regions where firms need more sophisticated professional services.
The distribution of income
As we have seen, in the ’80s Ragionieri and Commercialisti exhibited quite different growth
rates, with the Commercialisti increasing more rapidly than the Ragionieri and covering more
specialised areas of the market. These two effects should have played some role in explaining the
trends of the income levels for the two professions as shown in Figure 4.
Such trends are clearly symmetric with respect to those of the membership shown in Figure
1. For the Commercialisti - whose number more than doubled in the period - the average income
went up from 40 millions in 1980 to nearly 50 millions in 1991. footnote  For the Ragionieri -
whose membership grew less than 50 % over the 12 years period - the average income went up
from 23 millions to over 50 millions in 1991, overcoming in the last year that of the
Commercialisti.
The comparative growth of the incomes of the Ragionieri is quite surprising even in relation
with other professions, and it can hardly be justified only in terms of the particularly low rate of
entry in the profession. Indeed, in Figure 3 we see that the Ragionieri on average supply rather
traditional accounting services in a market in which the Commercialisti should face no problems
in competing for market shares. One would have expected that the Ragionieri were to be less
able to defend their incomes from the competition of the members of the other profession who
are better trained and can offer more highly qualified services. As the opposite is the case, one is
led to interpret these preliminary data as prima facie evidence in favor of the idea that the degreeof institutional control over entry is not an irrelevant factor in explaining the profitability of the
markets for professional services.
However, there is at least another institutional factor which must be considered in order to
evaluate this inverse relation between rate of entry and income levels. The demand for basic
accounting services - more likely to be provided by the Ragionieri - is expressed by small firms,
which after 1983 have been subjected to a new fiscal system which made less profitable not to
include the fees for the accounting services in the income report. On its turn this new incentive
for small firms to ask for a regular fiscal receipt from the Ragionieri forced the latter to increase
their reported income. Such change in the fiscal legislation would have little or no effect on
larger firms who were given relatively strong incentives to report their accounting fees even
before 1983.
The above hypothesis is at least partially supported by the data shown in Figure 4, as one of
the sub-periods of more dramatic growth in the levels of income for the Ragionieri occurs
precisely in 1984 and 1985, that is right after the change of the fiscal legislation, and as that
period is followed by two years of slightly declining incomes. However, a similar argument does
not apply to explain the upward trend observed in 1987. Therefore, at least for the late ’80s, as a
possible explanation for the differences in income trends we set forth a conjecture in terms of a
different admission policy which will be further explained in section 3.7.
The regional distribution of incomes
Since the Italian market is clearly differentiated along the geographical dimension (see
Figure 3) some more relevant information may come from the analysis of the regional
distribution of the income levels. This for two main reasons. First, because the higher the average
income in a given region, the higher the opportunity cost of entering the profession. Second, as
we have seen, because the degree of economic development seems to be in close relation with
the type and quality of the professional services.
To that purpose we show the regional distribution of incomes in the first (Figure 5) and
second (Figure 6) part of the period under observation. During the first period, the income
differential between Commercialisti and Ragionieri is still rather evident and is almost
completely concentrated in the more heavily industrialised Northern regions. In the second
period such differences have virtually disappeared, and the catching up has taken place almost
completely in the Northern regions. This seems to indicate that in the richest areas of the country,
where the larger firms operate (and therefore where stronger should be the demand for more
specialised accounting services), there has been a competitive edge of the profession
characterised by a lower level of human capital.
In this respect the convergence of incomes between Ragionieri and Commercialisti is not
surprising only in itself because of the relatively short period in which has taken place, but also
because its effects are more evident in those regions where one would have expected the
opposite trend to prevail.
For this lack of a convincing explanation of the above convergence, in the following sections
we will try to identify other factors which may not be observable at the regional level, but which
might shed some more light on this effect at the city/town level. However, working on the results
of the previous sections, even at that more disaggregated level, we will necessarily take into
account the rate of entry in the local market as one of the main candidates in order to explain the
different trends in incomes.
Entry and the profitability of the local market
The plots in Table 1 footnote  describe the relationship between the cumulative entry rate
over the 12 years period footnote  and the average professional incomes. The local areas are
sorted into 4 classes each including one fourth of the total areas from the lowest income level (1)
to the highest (4). As one can see, for both professions, the analysis of the local markets confirms
the rather neat inverse relationship between entry rate and income levels.As for the Commercialisti the cumulative entry rate is 74 % for the lowest income class, and
goes down to about 55 % for the highest income class. Moreover, while the median entry rate is
well above the mean for the first three income classes, it becomes lower for the highest one. This
indicates that by far the majority of local areas with high incomes is also characterised by yearly
entry rates of about 48 %.
In Table 1 one should also notice that the interquartile differential increases significantly
going from the lower income class to the higher ones. This larger variance in the local markets
with high incomes is mainly explained by differences in the first part of the distribution of the
entry rates. Indeed, in class 4 the first quartile is at a cumulative entry rate of 20 %, while in all
other classes is above 50 %. This means that the greatest proportion of local areas with very low
entry rates is also characterised by higher income levels.
A rather different sketch emerges from Table 1 looking at the income distribution for the
Ragionieri. First of all, and not surprisingly, the rate of entry is on average lower than that for the
Commercialisti in all income classes. In this respect, in classes 1 and 4 one half of the local
markets features a zero entry rate, and in classes 2 and 3 one fourth respectively. However, the
main difference with the Commercialisti is in the lack of a clear negative relationship between
incomes and average entry rates, maybe due to the relatively long period under observation. This
would point to a minor relevance of entry in determining the income levels in the local markets
as far as the Ragionieri are concerned.
Summing up, the analysis of the entry-income relation in the local markets supports the
evidence of the previous sections at the regional and national level as for a negative relationship
between the two variables. Such evidence is however less controversial for the Commercialisti
whose incomes seem more heavily affected by the entry of new competitors. Recalling Figure 2,
one can say that the convergence between income levels might be more due to the lack of control
on entry on part of the Commercialisti rather than a successful policy of entry restriction by the
Ragionieri. Hence, the low rate of entry for the Ragionieri can be alternatively explained as most
potential entrants elected to invest in human capital anticipating a higher return and discounting
a lower cost of higher education.
Age-earning profiles
The latter comments posit the question of the profitability of the investment in higher
education. It is then important to compare the main differences in the earning profiles of the two
professions object of the current analysis.
In Table 2 we show the distribution of incomes (along the vertical axis) in different classes of
age. The age classes are built splitting the membership in four classes of equal membership, and
giving each member the age he had in 1986, the median year of the period. Accordingly, the first
quartile of the age distribution for the Commercialisti is at 28, the median at 38, and the third
quartile at 47, while the analogous values for the Ragionieri are 4 to 5 years higher with the first
quartile at 33, the median at 41, and the third quartile at 51. In other words, the high entry rates
of the Commercialisti had a clear impact on the age structure of the membership.
In order to better understand how this different age structure influences the incomes at the
local level, in Table 2 one can also observe the income distributions for each class of age. For the
Commercialisti, the average income level in the first class is relatively low (about 25 millions),
but growing rapidly over 50 millions in the second, and reaching the highest level in the third,
after which the income falls back to about 60 millions.
To understand the differences between Commercialisti and Ragionieri one must keep in
mind that for the latter profession the age classes are shifted forward 4 to 5 years. Taking this
into account, one is not particularly surprised to detect only relatively small differences in terms
of average income comparing similar classes of age. However, if one looks at the income
dynamics, one notices that there is a much steeper ascending trend for the Commercialisti than
for the Ragionieri in terms of both means and medians.
This difference is not at all surprising when one takes into account the different level of
human capital available for the members of the two professions. Indeed, the Ragionieri in class 1(age below 33) have already a considerable working experience (they enter the market on
average at 22), and therefore have had the possibility to establish relatively strong
client-professional relationships or in other words to secure a relatively stable market share. On
the other hand, the Commercialisti in class 1 (lower than 28) which enter the market on average
at 25 have too a short time to establish the above relationships, and therefore to reap the returns
from the higher investment in human capital. When the Commercialisti reach approximately 35
years their average incomes are very similar to those of the Ragionieri, and when they get over
40 their advantage starts to widen.
Summing up, although the Commercialisti have a delayed entry due to the higher
requirements in terms of human capital, the rate of return on such capital seem to be significant
even in the first ten years of their professional life. It follows that the entry of new professionals
in the market has a relevant negative effect on the average income of the competitors.
The variance of the income distribution differs significantly over the classes, with the
younger professionals with an interquartile difference of less than 25 millions, while in the other
classes the differential is over 50 millions. This clearly depends on the process of specialisation
which takes place as the working experience accumulates, and which explains why the variance
for the Ragionieri in the first class is larger than for the Commercialisti. Moreover, the degree of
asymmetry in the distribution is quite different across classes with the first two with a much
greater density of incomes towards the lower end of the distribution (the median is far below the
average value). Only from the third class onwards both professions assume a more symmetric
distribution which signal that most members have reached a higher degree of income stability.
In this section we have commented on evidence related to the earning profile in the two
professions under observation. Such evidence has made it clear that while it takes about ten years
of professional activity for the Commercialisti to overcome the income levels of the Ragionieri,
the former manage to reach relatively high income level in a short period after entry. This points
to the fact that the entry of new professionals represents an immediate competitive threat for
those already established.
In this respect, Table 3 shows the average incomes in the first 8 years of professional life. For
the Commercialisti there is a steady growth of the average value, and a much steeper trend of the
median. As a result, the income distribution which starts very asymmetric with the average
values almost twice as large as the median, become progressively less skewed, so that in the
eighth year of profession the difference is less than 2 millions. This is due to the fact that at first
years of professional life very few new-comers succeed in reaching relatively high levels of
income while the vast majority stays at very low levels. Once the professionals get more
established, due to the quasi normal distribution of talents and disutilities from work, the
distribution of incomes tend to become more symmetric around the central values.
Furthermore, as the mean-median differential gets smaller, the interquartile differential
becomes much larger possibly due to a progressive process of specialisation and differentiation.
Alongside this process, the first quartile grows at a much slower rate than the third quartile
signalling the presence of a consistent minority of new professionals which is left to the margin
by the competitive process.
The new Ragionieri start from slightly higher income levels in the first three years of
professional life and witness thereafter slower rates of growth. What makes the case of the
Ragionieri particularly interesting is that the mean-median differential is not closing up even
after a relatively high number of years of professional life. This is mostly due to the very slow
growth of the first quartile (a large group is characterised by very low income levels with respect
to the mean of the professionals of equal experience) and points to the fact that the area of
professionals which either are working only part-time or are at the margin of the competitive
process.
Admission rates at the professional examinations
If the educational requirements are met, to enter the market a candidate must pass a
professional examination. Although the rules of such examinations do vary extensively acrossprofessions, on average the examining body is made of 40 % of representative of the professional
bodies, 40 % of civil servants and 20 % of university professors. However, as many university
professors, and sometimes even some civil servants are also involved, directly or indirectly, as
suppliers in the market for professional services, the professional bodies manage to keep a high
degree of control over the admission rates.
The evidence presented in the previous sections has focused on the link between income
levels and entry rates as measured by the actual earnings reported by the new professionals. It is
however clear that the rate of entry is determined by many economic and institutional factors,
among which is not at all easy, at this stage of the analysis, to single out the specific role played
by the professional bodies in establishing higher barriers to entry.
In this respect, we were able to collect systematic data only for the Commercialisti, whose
professional examination is organised by the Faculty of Economics of the State Universities. The
data refer to the period 1984-1991 and to 15 Universities. Figure 7 shows the average admission
rate for the professional examination of Commercialisti over the aforesaid period and the average
income of the Commercialisti in the cities where the examinations take regularly place every
year. footnote  In Figure 7 one observes a clear inverse relation between income levels and
admission rates. The cities with lowest average incomes are those in which the admission rates
are higher. Moreover, this relation becomes on average more clear-cut as the income levels get
larger, with the only exception of Urbino. footnote 
In order to find more evidence on this point, and recalling that the Commercialisti reduced
substantially their entry rate after 1988 (see Figure 2) it might be useful to look at the trend of the
admission rates between 1984 and 1991. From Figure 8 one can see that the last year featuring
relatively high admission rates is 1987. After that year, there is a clear decrease in the admission
rates so that the average rate for the period 1984-87 is 29 % while the same average for the
period 1988-91 is 24 %. We then conjecture that the professional boards are responding to the
declining incomes increasing the level of the institutional barriers to entry.
The data from both Figures 7 and 8 - although rather rough - make it hard to accept prima
facie the idea that such systematic differences in the admission rates over a relatively long period
are purely the result of differences in evaluation procedures and/or in the candidates’
performances. This notwithstanding, the above evidence is difficult to interpret, because it is not
clear in which direction one might establish a causal link between the two variables or if there is
a mutually reinforcing relationship. The higher income levels might be the result - among other
factors - of a more restrictive entry policy to keep a high quality standard in the profession,
and/or the admission rates could be seen as the result of a deliberate strategy of the professional
bodies to keep those incomes high.
Even if we assume that there is a mutually reinforcing relation between admission rates and
incomes, there are further interpretative problems. While it might be sensible to assume that in
areas where professional incomes are higher there are higher incentives to deter entry, it is not
completely clear why professional bodies in low income areas should be less ready to defend
their incomes by restricting entry. One possible interpretation is that if the cost to keep out a
candidate is fixed the benefits to deny access to the market are higher when the perspective
candidates will swiftly reach a relatively high income level. footnote 
The descriptive evidence shown so far repeatedly points out to a strong negative relationship
between rates of entry in the local markets and professional incomes. This is particularly true for
that profession (the Commercialisti) for which there is a need to invest more heavily in human
capital because the earning profile rises rather rapidly after entry. Moreover, we have seen that
the ability of the professional bodies to control entry might be a crucial variable in order to
stabilise incomes at a higher level. On this base, in next sections, we will estimate a demand and
supply model of the market for accounting services where we also treat the admission rates at the
professional examinations as an endogenous variable.
The market for CommercialistiWe estimate two different econometric models for the market for Commercialisti; the first is
a simultaneous-equations model for the demand and supply in which admission rates in the
profession are considered exogenous. The second specification takes explicitly into account the
possible endogeneity of this variable in a three simultaneous-equations system.
A demand and supply model
The demand and supply equation for a professional service can take many form; it is
however customary in the literature to consider the number of professional and their incomes as
proxies for quantities and prices of professional services respectively (Pashigian 1977, Noether
1986, Kantor and Legros 1993). We therefore propose the following model:
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Equation (1) represents the structural form of a semi-log inverse demand function, where yit
is the (natural) log of Commecialisti incomes, qit the number of active Commercialisti, ait the
admission rates, Xit the vector of exogenous demand determinants, and Oit the error term.
Equation (2) describes the supply side of the market, where Zit is the vector of exogenous supply
determinants and Rit the error term; yit and qit are therefore the only endogenous variables in this
system. Subscripts refer to cross-sectional units observed at time t.
This specification deserves some comments. If accountancy services are a normal good, we
would expect a downward sloping demand curve, but we do not have any a priori reason to
exclude that it could exhibit non standard functional forms. The literature has stressed that in a
market pervaded by information asymmetries prices convey information about quality; therefore
demand functions might be upward sloping along some critical intervals (Stiglitz 1987).
The admission rates are a crucial variable to explain how institutional barriers to entry
influence equilibrium quantities and prices in the market for accountants. Let us consider the
supply side first; when candidates decide to train and to try the examination in a local market
where Boards are very restrictive in the selection, they know that this will require a
career-specific investment. In particular, the high probability of failure, the extended period of
study given several trials needed before success will raise opportunity costs. Incumbent
Commercialisti are therefore protected from competition so that incomes can raise to provide a
fair return to an investment that is at least partly sunk. Under the assumption that restrictive
Boards are benevolent institutions who strive to admit only highly skilled and educated
candidates, and that after the examination there are no spill-overs among Board jurisdictions,
institutional barriers to entry may reveal effective in providing quality and a premium to
operating professionals at equilibrium.
As it has been stressed by Svorny (1981), for a given supply of Commercialisti, we should
therefore find in the demand equation a positive relation between Board restrictiveness and
incomes. We believe that this argument can be more fully understood in a dynamic specification,
so we have introduced two lagged values for admission rates.
The vector of exogenous determinants include socio-economic and anagraphic variables that
are described in detail in Table 4. Instead, the vector of exogenous variables in the supply
equation conveys information about the competitiveness of the local market in which
professionals operate, namely entry, exit and the standard deviation of incomes.
An ongoing debate in the theoretical literature on professional services is trying to establish
the effects of an increase or decrease in the number of competitors on fees. Obviously, the
conclusions of competing explanations depend on the assumption about the prevailing regime
within the industry. In monopolistically competitive regimes, the increasing monopoly modelposits that when the number of professionals is larger, search costs increase; this makes
consumers less sensitive to prices so that equilibrium professionals’ fees increase too
(Satterthwhite 1979). The target income theory claims that professionals may respond to an
increase in competition stimulating internally demand for their services and then maintaining
constant or even increasing their incomes (Evans 1974). footnote  If instead some degree on
intra-professional competition is displayed, entry will plausibly push downward incumbents’
incomes.
In this respect, the standard deviation of incomes can be interpreted as a proxy for the
prevailing market condition on the industry. If a market for a professional service is characterised
by a low variation in incomes, the professionals in general sell an homogeneous good and, if a
similar technologies are adopted, one would expect a price-taking behaviour. Viceversa, a high
variance in incomes might be a signal of high product differentiation and of the presence of
scattered monopolistic rents in the market. All this causes a substantial deviation from the ideal
of a perfectly competitive regime. footnote 
Endogenous barriers to entry
In the second model, we take explicitly into account the possible endogeneity of admission
rates. In this specification, we therefore assume that Boards, in establishing admission rates, do
not only evaluate the average quality of the candidate, but also the prevailing market conditions.
We propose the following three simultaneous-equations model:















  #   
  #   
  #   
Essentially, equation (3) and (4) are the same demand and supply of the previous model
except for the fact that we model a direct demand equation. Equation (5) provides our
specification of the barriers to entry function; as customary in the industrial organisation
literature, barriers to entry are put in relation with the profitability of the market: where
economic rents are present, one could argue that incumbents endeavour to preserve
them. footnote  Entry restrictions have a lasting effect on incumbents income which is stronger if
the profession operates in a monopoly regime and if Boards can directly manipulate pass-to-fail
ratios in response to market conditions. The vector Wit therefore includes the same exogenous
variables about the competitiveness of the market that were present in the previous specification
and other useful control dummies.
This model represent a logical step forward with respect to the simple demand and supply
since it provides a more appropriate setting to evaluate the counterbalancing welfare effects of
entry restrictions and to investigate the possible determinants of admission entry under an
alternative behavioural assumption by Boards.
Empirical results
Estimates of the first model are obtained by two stage least squares. By the order condition,
both equations are over-identified. We estimate therefore the reduced form of the supply
equation and replace quantity with its predicted value in the demand equation. This allows to
obtain consistent estimates despite the correlation between endogenous variables and the error
term.We performed a plain ordinary least squares for unbalanced panel data in the first and second
stage assuming constant slopes and intercepts. More sophisticated procedures that could be
useful to test the existence of individual or random effects could not be adopted since some
variables are averages in the time dimension.
Table 5 contains the empirical results for the first model; our estimates confirm the existence
of a downward sloping inverse demand curve in the market for Commercialisti; the
contemporaneous and lagged values coefficient of admission rates are highly significant and
negative; this indicates that institutional barriers to entry are indeed effective in raising
accountants’ income.
According to the theory we mentioned to in section 3.1, this indicates the existence of a
substantial premium for the Commercialista operating in a regime where entry is limited by
Boards. Supply being equal, consumers seem therefore willing to pay for the increase in the
quality of the service.
Excluding per capita income and the number of banks operating in the cross-section area,
socio-economic variables have the expected sign and are significant. As far as the anagraphic
variable are concerned, seniority and male sex are positively correlated to incomes; using a
quadratic expression for the variable age we capture the peculiarity of the age-earnings profile
that we observed in the descriptive analysis in section 2.6. Incomes are indeed increasing in age
but at decreasing rates. The time dummy is not significant despite the observed upward trend in
incomes in 1987. The regional dummy instead is significant, but has the wrong sign. As a matter
of fact, southern Italy accountants are characterised by far lower level of incomes with respect to
their northern and central Italy colleagues, as Figure 5 and 6 clearly indicate.
As we stated in the introductory section, Boards display substantial discretion in the
admission of new members in the profession. One can figure out that Boards might take into
account income levels to manipulate entry and therefore supply, neglecting the average quality of
the candidate as the primary variable during the selection. If admission rates were an endogenous
variable, the estimates of the simple demand and supply model would be inconsistent.
In this direction, we have performed a Hausman (1978) test adopting the omitted variable
interpretation; footnote  As Table 6 shows, we could reject the exogeneity of admission rates at
the 1 % significance level. We turn therefore to our second specification that explicitly takes into
account the endogeneity of admission rates. Three-stage least squares estimates for the second
model are reported in Table 7. footnote 
In the demand equation, equilibrium quantity of accountancy services are positively related
to prices; this result contradicts the information of the previous model, where the demand
function was downward sloping. If the services provided by Commercialisti are a search or
credence good, consumers are not able to evaluate quality properly and tend to infer it from
prevailing fees (Nelson 1970, Darby and Karni 1973). Therefore, where fees are higher,
consumers tend to expand their demand since the information asymmetry is partially fulfilled.
The supply equation is instead a conventional upward sloping function; as fees increase, a larger
quantity of professional services will be supplied.
Now we turn to the main variable of interest of our analysis. Indeed, when treated as an
endogenous variable in the system, admission rates result a very interesting variable to explain
the equilibrium quantities in the market for Commercialisti. First of all, we claim that the lagged
values for the admission rates deserve closer attention; even if it is necessary to include
contemporaneous values for that to be a proper simultaneous equation system, there are
well-grounded economic reasons to discard that admission rates could have an immediate impact
on incomes and quantities. As far as incomes are concerned, it is not sensible to establish any
economic effect between the rate of new admissions in one year and income in the same year;
Commercialisti that have passed the examination cannot immediately generate any real effects
on incumbents’ incomes. The same argument applies for the quantity of accountancy services
actually demanded. Once again, it is rather difficult that consumer perceive instantaneously the
variation in the average quality of the professional. These effects are more tangible in the
following years after some consumption activity has been carried out.Given these caveats, we observe firstly a strong negative correlation between past admission
rates and incomes in the supply equation; this indicates quite clearly that the institutional barrier
to entry is successful in creating rents. On the same line of reasoning of the previous model, the
rationale for this economic rent could be find in the higher human capital investment that is
necessary to step in the profession in a local market where Boards are quite selective. At this
juncture, it is fundamental to establish if the selection of candidates is not biased by other factors,
namely the profitability of the local market or the competitiveness of the industry. A close
inspection of the admission rates equation clarifies that past incomes within the profession seem
to be an important variable to explain the restrictiveness of the Boards. The negative correlation
we find between past incomes and admission rates indicates clearly that the profitability of the
market explain at least partly the admission policy. Boards are indeed restrictive where
incumbents enjoy economic rents; in addition, the sign on standard deviation of incomes
confirms that less competitive markets exhibit lower admission rates in the market for
Commercialisti.
It is however possible to find a rationale for this anti-competitive behaviour by Boards; in
fact the policy of creating and preserving rents may be functional to provide a relatively high
return for those skilled Commercialisti who are the only admitted in the professional society.
This argument does not seem too convincing; first, it is not at all clear that a policy of entry
restriction should make consumers better off if their demand is upward sloping. Second, from
our estimates the equilibrium consumption of services is lower in local markets where Boards
have been restrictive. The coefficient on lagged admission rates in the demand equation are in
fact both significant and positive. One could therefore argue that the quality-inducing policy has
not been successful in increasing the willingness to pay for quality of a consumer who is
peculiarly inclined to infer it by prevailing fees.
Some other interest results are apparent from our estimation; in the demand equation, with
the exclusion of the number of banks, the vector of socio-economic variables is significant and
has the appropriate sign. The regional dummies confirm some the stylized facts that emerged
from the descriptive analysis: in the southern regions, income levels are substantially lower and
admission rates much higher. In the supply equation, more entries reduce the profitability of the
market, and this indicates that competition tends to dissipate rents. Finally, despite the relatively
lower significance of the coefficient on standard deviation of incomes in the supply equation, we
claim that a lower variability in incomes is associated with lower prices and higher admission
rates. This result confirms that competition operates in downsizing profits and that, where
economic rents are not tangible, Boards are not concerned to restrict entry.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a systematic study on the market for Italian accountants; this
market deserves close attention since the same service is provided by two distinct professions
(Commercialisti and Ragionieri) which differ in terms of input regulation. By law, only
Commercialisti must have a university degree to be allowed to practice. The paper has shown the
existence of a substantial earning differential over the professional life cycle; we claim that this
differential and the competitive threat exercised by new entrants and by the less qualified
Ragionieri lie at basis of the admission policy administered by incumbent Commercialisti who
are widely represented in the examining body.
Our empirical results indicate clearly that entry reduces sensibly the profitability of the
market and that the institutional barrier to entry, namely the professional examination, is
effective in preserving monopoly rents in the market. Furthermore, we have shown that the
admission policy itself is endogenous and deeply influenced by market condition. Indeed, the
cross-sectional variance in admission rates all over the country can only partially be explained by
differences in education or professional ability of the candidates. Our analysis indicates that,
once treated as an endogenous variable, admission rates are highly negatively correlated with
past level of incomes. As far as Italian Commercialisti are concerned, this result casts somedoubts about the view that professional Boards are benevolent institutions who strive to preserve
high quality standards of active professionals and posits the question whether it might represent a
possible guideline for an intervention by anti-trust authorities.
This analysis obviously can be extended in many directions; first, it would be extremely
interesting to collect data on admission rates for Ragionieri. The comparative analysis between
the two segment of the market for accountants would allow to put in relation differences in
admission policies with the profitability of the two professions. In addition, it would be possible
to estimate properly the degree of inter-professional competition and of substitutability between
the services provided by Commercialisti and Ragionieri.
Finally, our estimates will probably be improved if we could have available a panel where all
variables were not averages in the time dimension; in this case we could test for fixed or random
effects in the cross-section. Furthermore, it would be useful to carry out other diagnostics to test
the robustness of our specification. We leave all this to further research.
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Fig 5 - Regional income distribution of Commercialisti and Ragionieri 1980-85





















































































































































































Fig 6 - Regional income distribution of Commercialisti and Ragionieri 1986-91 
Fig. 7 - Average incomes and admission rates for Commercialisti
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#RIF!Table 1 Cumulative entry rates and income in local markets  - Average values 1980-91
COMMERCIALISTI
ENTRY RATE 
           1 +         *-----*     +-----+     +-----+     +-----+
             |         |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
             |         |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
             |         |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
         0.8 +         |     |     *-----*     |     |     |     |
             |         |  +  |     |     |     |     |     |     |
             |         |     |     |  +  |     |     |     |     |
             |         |     |     |     |     *--+--*     |     |
         0.6 +         |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
             |         |     |     |     |     |     |     |  +  |
             |         +-----+     +-----+     |     |     *-----*
             |            |           |        +-----+     |     |
         0.4 +            |           |           |        |     |
             |            |           |           |        |     |
             |            |           |           |        |     |
             |            |           |           |        |     |
         0.2 +            |           |           |        +-----+
              ------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------
  INCOME CLASS        1           2           3           4
RAGIONIERI
ENTRY RATE 
           1 +         +-----+        |           |           |
             |         |     |        |           |           |
             |         |     |        |           |           |
             |         |     |        |           |           |
         0.5 +         |     |     +-----+     +-----+        |
             |         |  +  |     |  +  |     |     |     +-----+
             |         |     |     *-----*     *--+--*     |  +  |
             |         |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
           0 +         *-----*     +-----+     +-----+     *-----*
              ------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------
  INCOME CLASS    1           2           3            42
Table 2 Relations between income and age - Average values 1980-91
COMMERCIALISTI
INCOME
             |            *           |        +-----+     +-----+
             |            *           |        |     |     |     |
      100000 +            0           |        |     |     |     |
             |            0        +-----+     *--+--*     |     |
             |            0        |     |     |     |     *--+--*
             |            0        |  +  |     |     |     |     |
       50000 +            |        *-----*     |     |     |     |
             |         +-----+     |     |     +-----+     +-----+
             |         |  +  |     +-----+        |           |
             |         *-----*        |           |           |
           0 +            |           |           |           |
              ------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------
      AGE CLASS          <28        28-38       38-47        >47
RAGIONIERI
INCOME
      100000 +            |           |        +-----+        |
             |            |        +-----+     |     |     +-----+
             |            |        |     |     |     |     |     |
             |         +-----+     |  +  |     *--+--*     |  +  |
       50000 +         |  +  |     *-----*     |     |     |     |
             |         *-----*     |     |     |     |     *-----*
             |         +-----+     +-----+     +-----+     |     |
             |            |           |           |        +-----+
           0 +            |           |           |           |
              ------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------
  AGE CLASS         <33        33-41       41-51         >51
Incomes are expressed in thousands 1992 Italian LireTable 3 Average incomes in the first eight years after entry
COMMERCIALISTI
INCOME 1991
    90000 +            0           0           |           |           |           |           |        +-----+
          |            0           0           |           |           |           |           |        |     |
          |            0           0           |           |           |           |           |        |     |
          |            0           0           |           |           |           |        +-----+     |     |
    80000 +            0           0           |           |           |           |        |     |     |     |
          |            0           |           |           |           |           |        |     |     |     |
          |            0           |           |           |           |           |        |     |     |     |
          |            0           |           |           |           |        +-----+     |     |     |     |
    70000 +            0           |           |           |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |
          |            0           |           |           |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |
          |            0           |           |           |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |
          |            0           |           |           |        +-----+     |     |     |     |     |     |
    60000 +            |           |           |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
          |            |           |           |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |     |  +  |
          |            |           |           |        +-----+     |     |     |     |     |     |     *-----*
          |            |           |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |     |  +  |     |     |
    50000 +            |           |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
          |            |           |           |        |     |     |     |     |  +  |     *-----*     |     |
          |            |           |        +-----+     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
          |            |           |        |     |     |     |     |  +  |     |     |     |     |     |     |
    40000 +            |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |     *-----*     |     |     |     |
          |            |        +-----+     |     |     |  +  |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
          |            |        |     |     |     |     |     |     *-----*     |     |     |     |     |     |
          |            |        |     |     |  +  |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
    30000 +         +-----+     |     |     |     |     *-----*     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
          |         |     |     |  +  |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     +-----+
          |         |     |     |     |     *-----*     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |        |
          |         |  +  |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     +-----+        |
    20000 +         |     |     *-----*     |     |     |     |     |     |     +-----+        |           |
          |         |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     +-----+        |           |           |
          |         *-----*     |     |     |     |     +-----+        |           |           |           |
          |         |     |     |     |     |     |        |           |           |           |           |
    10000 +         |     |     +-----+     +-----+        |           |           |           |           |
          |         |     |        |           |           |           |           |           |           |
          |         +-----+        |           |           |           |           |           |           |
          |            |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |
        0 +            |           |           |           |           |           |           |           |
           ------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+----
 YEARS AFTER  ENTRY    1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8
RAGIONIERI
INCOME 1991
          |            |           |           |           |           |        +-----+        |           |
    70000 +            |           |           |           |           |        |     |        |           |
          |            |           |           |           |           |        |     |     +-----+     +-----+
          |            |           |           |           |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |
          |            |           |           |           |        +-----+     |     |     |     |     |     |
    60000 +            |           |           |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
          |            |           |           |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
          |            |           |           |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
          |            |           |        +-----+     +-----+     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
    50000 +            |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
          |            |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |  +  |     |     |
          |            |           |        |     |     |     |     |     |     |  +  |     |     |     |  +  |
          |            |        +-----+     |     |     |     |     |  +  |     |     |     |     |     |     |
    40000 +            |        |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     *-----*     |     |
          |            |        |     |     |  +  |     |  +  |     |     |     *-----*     |     |     |     |
          |         +-----+     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     *-----*
          |         |     |     |  +  |     |     |     |     |     *-----*     |     |     |     |     |     |
    30000 +         |     |     |     |     *-----*     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
          |         |     |     |     |     |     |     *-----*     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
          |         |  +  |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
          |         |     |     *-----*     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
    20000 +         |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     +-----+     +-----+
          |         *-----*     |     |     |     |     |     |     +-----+     +-----+        |           |
          |         |     |     |     |     +-----+     +-----+        |           |           |           |
          |         |     |     +-----+        |           |           |           |           |           |
    10000 +         |     |        |           |           |           |           |           |           |
          |         +-----+        |           |           |           |           |           |           |
           ------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+---
 YEARS AFTER ENTRY     1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8
Incomes are expressed in thousands 1992 Italian Lire